Keywords
Challenges Encountered
Coping Strategies
Counterinsurgency
Institutional Interventions
Internal Security Operation
and Risk
How to Cite
Abstract
This phenomenological study investigates the lived experiences of personnel from the 2nd Cagayan Provincial Mobile Force Company (PMFC) during counterinsurgency (COIN) operations against the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army (CPP-NPA). Utilizing semi-structured interviews, the research uncovers the perceptions, challenges, coping strategies, and institutional interventions encountered by 2nd Cagayan PMFC personnel. Key findings reveal that adequate funding and resources are crucial for operational effectiveness and morale, but insufficient Internal Security Operation Funds hinder readiness. Operational challenges include logistical constraints and resource limitations, with significant risks and burnout among personnel highlighting the need for comprehensive support systems. Continuous skill enhancement and training are vital for preparing troops for modern counterinsurgency challenges. Community engagement programs, such as Police Community Relations (PCR), are essential for fostering trust and cooperation with local communities, while holistic rehabilitation and reintegration programs for former extremists are crucial for long-term stability. Recommendations include increasing Combat Incentive Pay (CIP) and Combat Duty Pay (CDP), intensifying training programs, expanding PCR initiatives, and investing in comprehensive rehabilitation programs such as; Cardiac Rehabilitation Programs, Neurological Rehabilitation Programs, Spinal Cord Injury Rehabilitation Programs and any facility that is primarily engaged in providing outpatient com for the treatment of Medicare beneficiaries who are injured, disabled, or recovering from illness.to ensure successful disengagement and reintegration of former insurgents. This study emphasizes the importance of strategic institutional support, continuous skill development, and strong community relations in achieving sustained success in counterinsurgency operations.References
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